The Fighting Mongoose

2007-07-10T00:14:00.000-05:00

What is the relationship between semantics and pragmatics? Or, what is the connection between theories regarding formal languages and theories about natural languages?

Based on my (very) limited knowledge of Paul Grice's work, I offer an example of the word 'or'.

Formally speaking, the word 'or' expresses the logical connective 'v'. 'v', called a wedge, is a truth functional binary connective. A formula such as (P v Q) is true if and only if at least one of the disjuncts is true. The formula is false if and only if both disjuncts are false.

There is a rule of inference that allows us to infer from a true proposition P a disjunction containing P. If P is true, then (P v Q) is also true.

This is all well and good in our formal language, but it doesn't seem to make much sense in natural language. Let's say that I make some warranted assertion, like "Madison is the capital of Wisconsin." According to our above-mentioned rule of inference, I am also warranted in asserting something like "Madison is the capital of Wisconsin or the moon is made of Swiss cheese." It seems strange, though, that I would be warranted in asserting something like that.

Grice argues that pragmatically speaking, the rule regarding the use of 'or' is that we only use it when we feel that we aren't quite warranted in asserting either of the disjuncts. Each disjunct of a disjunction makes a stronger claim than the disjunction itself. For instance, the disjunction "The keys are on the desk, or they are on the couch" is a weaker statement than either of the disjuncts. If I was warranted in asserting either disjunct, then I'd have no reason to assert the disjunction.

Ok, that's fine. So how do the two types of 'or' relate? It seems to me that they don't at all. Am I missing something here? What's the connection?

2007-04-11T00:03:00.000-05:00

Let's say that you are sitting in your office, and you overhear two friends, let's call them Bob and Jane, talking out in the hallway. Bob asks Jane where you are. From your office, you overhear Jane's reply, "He/she might be at the student center."

Did Jane say something true or false?

2007-04-02T22:49:00.000-05:00

Eric Schwitzgebel (Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of California at Riverside) has a blog post about applying to graduate programs. This may be late for some, but it is early for people applying next year.

It may also be worth looking at some posts here.

2006-12-06T12:41:00.000-06:00

Over at the Garden of Forking Paths, there's a post about movies that touch on themes in action theory.

I thought about the possibility of teaching a philosophy 101 class using just movies. Let's say you were planning the curriculum for such a class. Which movies do you think would best illustrate basic themes and subthemes in ethics, metaphysics and epistemology?

You don't have to provide a complete list. Any suggestion to get the ball rolling will be fine.

2006-11-10T10:59:00.000-06:00

The new Gourmet is up. What's interesting is that if you go to the MA rankings page, they now list each school's area of excellence. Supposedly, our areas of excellence are philosophy of language & mind, and history of philosophy (esp. early modern, Marx, Frankfurt School).

Would you agree?

2006-10-31T13:37:00.000-06:00

Here's something from an email I sent to Adam:

"One approaches metaphysical inquiry with a number of beliefs. Many of these will not trace back to empirical beliefs, at least not in any direct way. These beliefs may be particular, as for example the belief that I was once a young boy, or they may be more general and theoretical, for example the belief that identity is transitive. One then develops a theory preserving as many of these ordinary beliefs as possible, while remaining consistent with science. There is a familiar give and take: one must be prepared to sacrifice some beliefs one initially held in order to develop a satisfying theoretical account. But a theoretical account should take ordinary belief as a whole seriously, for only ordinary beliefs tie down the inquiry."

Theodore Sider, Four-Dimensionalism

Now, I realize that such a methodology is not one that is exclusive to contemporary analytic metaphysics. Also, I am ready to admit that this may not be the best or even appropriate form of inquiry. However, I am suspicious of those positions that seem dismissive of this sort of project. Again, I may just be interpreting the continentals incorrectly, but it just doesn't seem to me that guys like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the German idealists (as well as those crazy French postmoderns) are interested in engaging in the above-mentioned investigation. If it happens to be the case that they are, then I'll go and take a look at what they have to say. If not, I am still open to what their reasons may be as to why such a program as the one mentioned here might be wrong or ill-conceived.

2006-10-19T15:05:00.000-05:00

When I worked at my parents' store last summer, I'd bring along something to read to pass the time. I'd read stuff with "metaphysics," or "epistemology" in the title. Customers would come in and ask me what I'm studying in school. I'd tell them that I'm studying philosophy. There'd be a five second silence before they would inevitably ask, "What do you study in philosophy?"

I realized that this question is extraordinarily difficult to answer when the person who's asking barely finished high school, and the vast majority of my parents' customers fell into that category. Most anything that one would study, no matter how abstruse, can always be generalized into something familiar. Quantum mechanics can be restated as "physics," Hellenistic archaeology could be translated as "history," and Victorian literature can be described as "English." However, "philosophy" is about as general as you can get, and even there people are in the dark about what that is. It seems that very few public primary and secondary schools would have a class that would even remotely resemble a philosophy class. So people really have no way of even formulating an adequate concept of philosophy, much less finding any value in the subject.

The situation improves somewhat for people with a college education, but not by much. At this point, individuals have something of an idea of what philosophy is. They may have even taken a few courses. But for the most part, people still find no value in the study of philosophy. The number one question I get from these folks is, "What are you going to do with a philosophy degree?" Some may ask this question with the sincere intention of finding out what philosophers do in the real world, but most ask in that tone of voice implying that philosophy is about at useful for life as a call to Miss Cleo is.

However, others may be pleased to find out that I study philosophy, and, thinking themselves to be conversant in philosophy will then ask me some question like who my favorite philosophers are. They're expecting to hear names like Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Nietzche, etc. I proceed to drop names like Saul Kripke, Alvin Plantinga, David Lewis, Brian Leftow, Ted Sider, John Hawthorne, Dean Zimmerman, Rod Chisholm, Willard Quine, Peter van Inwagen, Trenton Merricks, Lynne Rudder Baker, etc. Of course after I say this we again find ourselves in those five seconds of silence.

It's not like these names are obscure, either. Imagine someone (we'll name him Bob) who's only contact with basketball is some book about the history of basketball. You, as a basketball fan, happen to find yourself in a casual, dinner party conversation wth Bob. Bob asks you who your favorite basketball players are. He's expecting to hear names like George Mikan, Bill Russell, Wilt Chamberlain, Jerry West, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Larry Bird, Magic Johnson, Michael Jordan, etc. You give him names like Lebron James, Steve Nash, Dwayne Wade, Tim Duncan, Dirk Nowitzski, Shaquile O'Neal, etc. The situation is analogous in philosophy. Grad students follow philosophers like professional athletes. We should make philosopher trading cards.

Of course the interested individual mentioned above may, instead of asking about my favorite philosophers, ask about the kind of philosophy I study. Again, what this person may be expecting to hear will likely be very different from what I am about to tell him/her. Most people don't realize that the type of philosophy that I study is closer to physics, math and linguistics than it is to guys wearing togas and shooting the shit around the agora.

The point of all this is to reveal the prominent gap between the layperson and the professional when it comes to familiarity about what philosophy is and what it is supposed to do. I attribute this gap to the fact that philosophy is nowhere to be seen in elementary, middle, or high schools. Why is this? Why don't they teach philosophy in schools? It's not like biology, american history, shakespeare, or trigonometry will be "practical" to those who will find careers in middle management or customer service. So why not teach kids to think independently at an early age?

2006-10-14T13:30:00.000-05:00

The Leiter Reports have been giving previews of the upcoming Philosophical Gourmet. Here are the top 20 schools for metaphysics and epistemology (which include phil language, phil mind, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of action, philosophical logic, and phil religion).

1. Oxford University (4.3)

2. New York University (3.9)

2. Rutgers University, New Brunswick (3.9)

4. University of Notre Dame (3.8)

5. University of Texas, Austin (3.5)

6. Massachussetts Institute of Technology (3.4)

6. Princeton University (3.4)

6. University of St. Andrews/University of Stirling Joint Program (3.4)

9. University of California, Los Angeles (3.3)

10. Stanford University (3.2)

10. University of Pittsburgh (3.2)

10. University of Southern California (3.2)

13. Cornell University (3.1)

13. University of California, Berkeley (3.1)

13. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (3.1)

13. Yale University (3.1)

17. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (3.0)

18. City University of New York Graduate Center (2.9)

18. Columbia University (2.9)

18. Indiana University, Bloomington (2.9)

18. University of California, Riverside (2.9)

18. University of Massachussetts, Amherst (2.9)

Geez. Most of these schools are nearly impossible to get into (with funding). Maybe I should change my interests over to applied ethics or something.

2006-10-05T19:45:00.000-05:00

1) An infant has the same moral worth as it did the day before it was born, and this carries back (at least) through most of the third trimester of pregnancy.

2) During most of the third trimester, labor can be artificially induced with a high survival rate.

3) Therefore, either (non-medically needed) third trimester abortions are immoral or infanticide is moral.

It seems that there is no reason to think that the process of birth adds any moral value to a child. The usual moral grounding for abortion is that a woman has rights to control her body, and I’m sure many of us are familiar with the Violinist example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violinist_(Thought_Experiment) . The third trimester gives us a different position than the Violinist however, because a woman could “disconnect” without necessitating death. I cannot find any reason then why a woman could not maintain control of her body with a lesser right to have labor induced and simply leave the child for adoption.

Maintaining the right to third trimester abortions then would be a right beyond control of one’s body and be a right to end the life of the child independent of its relation to one’s body. If we wish to say that the moral value of the third trimester child is so low, then it seems that we should simply say that infanticide is permissible.

I find it hard to see an argument for another pro-choice position, but maybe someone can enlighten me.

2006-09-09T19:16:00.000-05:00

This entry is not technically philosophical, but more about the state of philosophy education, particularly at the graduate level.

To the extent of my knowledge, most of the great coaches that I am aware of (e.g. Pat Riley, Phil Jackson, Larry Brown, Joe Torre, Bill Parcells, Jimmy Johnson, Joe Gibbs, Mike Holmgren, et al) were not superstars during their tenure as players. It also seems that all-star/hall of fame players don't make very good coaches (fewer examples come to mind, but notable ones include Magic Johnson and Isaiah Thomas).

This seems to make some intuitive sense. Guys that ride the pine are the ones who have to work hard in order to develop the skills that they need in order to succeed. They weren't blessed with natural talent, so they learn everything the hard way. This puts them in a better position to teach others what they've learned. All-stars, however, can lean on their natural talents and therefore can get away with not having to learn the finer details of the game. They have an intuitive feel for the sport, whereas the benchwarmers need to figure things out at a much more explicit level. Because of their innate abilities, however, the all-stars have a difficult time explaining the mechanics of their success to others, hence they do not make good coaches.

I think there is a relevant analogy between sports and the academic world.

I hear lots of stories about well-known philosophers who are terrible teachers/advisors. I think these individuals often have a natural feel for philosophical discourse. They can run through arguments without having to make every step explicit. Because of this, they can stay abreast of the cutting edge of the debates and make a prolific number of contributions. However, they are also relatively less able to relate this knowledge to others who are philosophically less mature. It seems to me that those who are not as talented, who have to learn positions and arguments the harder way, by taking them step by step, are usually the ones who end up being better teachers. They are the ones who can communicate the subtle points of arguments in a manner that is comprehensible to the average graduate student, because they had to explain the same material to themselves.

There is, however, a point where the analogy breaks down. In sports, there is a distinction between coaches and players. There are individuals who are coaches, and there are those who are players, and there is not much overlap between the two at any given point in time. However, in academics, this is not the case. Members of faculty are both coaches and players at the same time, in that they take on the dual roles of teaching and reasearch. I think this is to the detriment of the students.

From my understanding of how the system works, a large determinant in whether one finds placement after completing a PhD is one's letters of recommendation from their advisory committee. There seems to be a positive relationship between the likelihood of finding a job and the academic reputation of the people writing your letters of recommendation. Thus, many would-be philosophers find themselves compelled to work with the most famous people in their department, and these famous individuals are often the ones who end up being substandard teachers. So the education and development of these students suffer as a result.

Now of course I am making generalizations here, and I am sure that there are some famous philosophers who are also excellent teachers (several come to mind immediately). We should be thankful for them. But I think that the number of famous philosophers who are bad teachers is high enough to make this a legitimate concern.

It would make more sense to me for the philosophical community (perhaps the APA) to recognize those faculty out there who are gifted teachers. Such recognition could be possible by tracking the career progress of their students (i.e. their publication record, presentations, and other contributions to philosophical discourse). Individuals whose students demonstrate such consistently good work as professional philosophers should be recognized for it, and their letters of recommendation should carry more weight in the eyes of hiring institutions.

2006-09-07T06:58:00.000-05:00

What is philosophy?

Classes have started and we have fresh meat... er, fresh minds to torment... er, encourage to grow with our wisdom. I am wondering what you tell them philosophy is. If you think that what you actually tell them is an over simplification, then what is the correct answer?

Stanford Professor Ken Taylor of Philosophy Talk says that this of philosophy here:

"There is really no one thing that philosophers do and not much that unifies the mulipliticity of different things that philosophers do. Philosophy is what people who call themselves philosophers do. And people who call themselves philosophers do all sorts of things."

I've tended to go with the answer of Prof. Rick Schubert, which is something very much like: Philosophy is that discipline which attempts to formulate, understand and answer fundamental questions, through the use of reason, which are not sufficiently addressed by science or religion.

2006-09-04T20:57:00.000-05:00

Within utilitarianism, there has been a classic debate between total and average utility. This distinction comes into play when there are questions of population size being discussed. If we were deciding as good utilitarians whether or not to fund greater access to birth control we may have to consider whether it is better to have a larger population or not. Given that birth control policy may not produce very precise results, we can assume that you have two options.

The first option is to not fund birth control and to restrict its access, such as by making the morning after pill require a prescription which would delay access, in order to allow the population to grow. This will result in having a very high population, and the population density may limit the joy everyone feels. As long as people are on average experiencing positive utility, this may be the best way to maximize the total level of happiness.

Some theorists believe that this is a bad outcome and that a smaller society of people happy with resource abundance would be preferred to a large society where scarcity prevents flourishing and the experiencing of greater degrees of average utility.

Population :: Average Utility :: Total Utility

1,000,000 :: 2 utils/person :: 2,000,000 utils

100,000 :: 8 utils/person :: 800,000 utils

In this chart, the average person in the smaller population are experiencing four times as much happiness, or happiness four times as often, than the average individual from the high population world. One may think that the smaller population is better off, and therefore exemplifies the “greatest good” desired by utilitarians. The greatest average utility principle may give very bad results in other situations however, and I will review one result which may be intuitively bad.

Having decided to spread birth control through your society and have a small and joyous populous, you now have a new decision to make. There is a group in your society the members of which are happy (say averaging 1 utils), but not as happy as the average for your society. This group is fairly isolated, so no one would miss them or be missing out on their production if the group were to disappear. You have the ability to make this group disappear and, though this would be eliminating happy people, this will increase the average happiness of the society. This creates a decision chart like:

Population :: Average Utility

100,000 :: 8

90,000 :: 8.7

Thus, if you just killed this group you would maximize average utility just as you did by encouraging birth control.

One man’s modus tollens is another man’s modus ponens.